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The purpose of this paper is to understand the eects of endogenous markups
and trade costs on the pricing behavior of exporters when rms are heteroge-
neous in productivity. Using new analytical distributions for markups under
Bertrand competition, we uncover Ricardian patterns of export pricing that
generate higher markups and export price volatility when industrialized coun-
tries sell to developing countries. These Ricardian patterns dissipate when
developing countries move from bilateral to multilateral trade liberalization.
The results arise from a form of price rigidity for exports that arises endoge-
nously due to cut-throat competition, even though prices are otherwise per-
fectly exible.
Diminishing pass-through and volatility in traded goods prices over the
past several decades, as documented by (Bergin and Feenstra (2008), Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2008), and Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2010)), present
a puzzle for models of heterogeneous rms with endogenous markups. Atke-
son and Burstein (2007 and 2008) demonstrate for the rst time that trade
costs reduce the market power of heterogeneous exporters, limiting the degree
to which they can pass through shocks to marginal costs to consumers and
thereby dampening export price volatility relative to other aggregates. Yet
trade costs have been falling at the same time as pass-through and volatility
in traded goods prices. This presents a conceptual challenge for current models
of trade with heterogeneous rms. Both Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2012)
and Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012a) show for
a wide class of models with imperfect competition and endogenous markups
that trade liberalization can actually increase the market power of exporters
as they internalize the drop in trade costs by charging higher markups, given
that the liberalization takes place between symmetric countries or between
only two countries with independent productivity distributions. Under these
circumstances, theory would predict increased pass-through and volatility in
an age of falling trade costs while the data suggests the opposite.
In this paper, we demonstrate with concise functional forms exactly when
1trade produces pro-competitive eect under Bertrand competition with het-
erogeneous rms that would result in less ability for exporters to pass through
shocks to marginal cost into the prices of their goods. We argue that devel-
oping countries must charge lower markups when exporting to technologically
more advanced countries, which reduces their ability to pass through shocks
to marginal costs into prices. Further, accession into multilateral trade agree-
ments can reduce pass-through and volatility in the prices of goods exported
to developing countries from industrialized countries. Bilateral trade liber-
alization allows exporters from a favored industrialized country to compete
principally with domestic producers in the destination market, where the av-
erage foreign exporter would have a technological edge. However, multilateral
trade liberalization in this case forces exporters from dierent industrialized
countries to compete more directly with each other, so they have less ability
to garner market power in the destination market and thus less ability to pass
on cost shocks into prices.
We characterize the bilateral result, where exporters respond to trade lib-
eralization by charging higher markups, resulting in increased volatility, as an
anti-competitive eect. The decrease in markups charged by exporters in the
favored nation when the destination market expands to multilateral liberal-
ization is thus a pro-competitive eect. Pro-competitive eects also emerge
among domestic producers when their native market opens to trade under any
circumstances, as new competition from foreign rivals forces them to reduce
markups.1 The mechanisms behind pro-competitive eects have heretofore
been a black box in international trade and macroeconomics{ are they driven
by technological dierences, by domestic contestability, by geographic fric-
tions? We show that they are a product of all three and show their relative
contributions.
Understanding this balance is crucial in open economy models, as it gener-
1There is ample empirical evidence from the trade literature that pro-competitive eects
from trade exist and can be large. Among these are Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994),
Roberts and Supina (1996), Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), Novy (2010), and Feenstra and
Weinstein (2010), Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2012), and de Loecker, Goldberg, Khandel-
wal, and Pavcnik (2012).
2ates a type of price inertia distinct from the conventional forms of price rigidity
assumed in standard macroeconomic models. Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and
2008) and Alessandria (2009) show that the special behavior of the endoge-
nous markups combines with costly trade to generate a lower volatility of the
terms of trade relative to the real exchange rate.2 This rigidity can have other
important macroeconomic manifestations, as in Obstfeld's (2009) argument
that incomplete pass-through in export prices following a nominal exchange
rate appreciation broke the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eect during the ap-
preciation of the Japanese yen from 1985-95. Recent evidence also suggests
a Ricardian inuence over the degree of pass-through: Bergin and Fenstra
(2008) and Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2010) show that pass-through is par-
ticularly limited for exporters from developing countries to the U.S. market,
while Frankel, Parsley, and Wei (2012) document that pass-through is greater
for exports to developing countries than to industrialized countries. We believe
that the two sets of ndings{ lower markups under trade and relatively rigid
export prices, with the degree of rigidity varying in a Ricardian pattern{ are
related through trade costs and Bertrand competition by heterogeneous rms.
Our model involves a nite number of rms competing within each industry.
The most ecient rm in the industry ultimately becomes the sole supplier
of that particular good, but only because it beats back its competitors by
underselling them: it cannot charge a price higher than the marginal cost of
its next best rival. We argue that trade costs make rms' prices more likely to
be bound by their next best rival when selling overseas compared to their home
market. We show analytically that this cutthroat competition can generate
reduced markups under trade, pricing to market, and imperfect pass-through
by causing price rigidity even when prices are not set in advance due to menu
costs or other constraints.
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003, hereafter BEJK) pioneered
the use of this form of price competition with heterogeneous rms and trade
2In particular, papers such as Baxter and Landry (2010), Berman, Martin, and Mayer
(2012), Fitzgerald and Haller (2010), Schoenle (2010), Gopinath, Itshoki, and Rigobon
(2010), and Gopinath and Itshoki (2010) show that rms often price to market and do not
fully pass on changes in marginal costs and exchange rates to foreign buyers.
3almost a decade ago. It is not clear whether they assumed the number of rivals
to be innitely large or Poisson distributed.3 In contrast, we generalize their
approach by endogenizing and explicitly focusing on a nite number of entrants
that compete in each industry so that markups are sensitive to market size
and structure, in line with ndings in the closed-economy literature such as
those by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005). When the number of competitors
is innitely large, our distribution of markups converges to that of BEJK. In
particular, in this limiting case, there are no anti- or pro-competitive eects
from trade, allowing Bertrand competition to t within a gravity framework.
Because we explicitly include a nite number of rivals, we see that the dis-
tribution of markups is directly aected by the number of rms competing to
be the low-cost supplier in the closed economy or in the case when both of the
best potential suppliers to a market are in the same source country.4 One can
conceptualize the number of rivals as an exogenous policy parameter, as in the
numerical analyses by Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and 2008) and de Blas and
Russ (2011), or endogenize it using a free entry condition as we do below, and
as Holmes, Hsu, and Li (2011) have recently done, as well. The key is that
unlike models using Chamberlinian monopolistic competition or limit pricing,
such as Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the degree of entry
embodied in the number of rivals changes the shape of the entire distribution
of markups, costs, and rm size. Although the number of rivals appears simi-
lar to a scale parameter representing technological advancement in our model,
it has a more complex eect on the distribution of markups through the joint
distribution of the rst and second order statistic for unit cost. The num-
ber of rivals itself is not critical, unless it becomes so large as to obscure the
3Their results nest within ours and within those of Holmes, Hsu, and Li (2011) if the
number of rivals is innite. However, in the statistics literature, it is known that a Poisson-
distributed number of draws from the Weibull can be integrated out to focus on other
parameters (Raftery 1987). Finally, the number of rivals also drops out of the distribution
of markups in two special cases discussed below if the underlying distribution of eciency
levels is Pareto, rather than Fr echet.
4Claessens and Laeven (2004) and de Blas and Russ (2011) refer to this as \contestabil-
ity," a phenomenon with roots in the industrial organization literature. See in particular
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), related to the Panzar-Rossi measure of contestability
used by Claessens and Laeven (2004).
4eects of trade costs or technological dierences on market structure. Most
importantly, having a nite number of rivals allows other elements of mar-
ket structure{ including trade costs and dierences in technology and wages
across countries{ to inuence the distribution of markups. We use these new,
closed-form distributions to draw out Ricardian eects on markups, as well
as the impact of multi- versus bilateral trade liberalization on price volatility
that have been observed empirically but not integrated into the theoretical
literature on pass-through.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the relation-
ship of our model with previous empirical and theoretical studies. Section 3
presents a simple closed economy model with analytical solutions for the dis-
tribution of markups and prices which include the number of rivals. We show
the relationship between entry and the aggregate domestic price level. Section
4 considers the implications of trade in goods for these distributions given
asymmetric trading partners. In Section 5, we show that our distribution of
markups implies a higher degree of price adjustment (higher price volatility) in
response to these shocks for domestic versus export sales. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The basic insight motivating our construction of the model stems from the nu-
merical simulations of Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and 2008), Garetto (2012),
and de Blas and Russ (2011). All of these numerical studies start with a
Fr echet or lognormal distribution of rm eciency levels, then build on BEJK
by computing markups under Bertrand competition (also Cournot in the case
of Atkeson and Burstein (2008)). Collectively, they note that the size of the
markup shrinks under trade and that trade costs make rms less able to pass
on shocks to marginal costs by raising export prices.5 They also note another
5A number of recent papers make advances using nominal rigidities to achieve the stickier
export prices behind the low relative volatility of the terms of trade. These include Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2008), Gopinath and Itshoki (2010), and Schoenle (2010). Alessandria
(2009) and Drodz and Nosal (2012) use consumer-oriented frictions in distribution and
marketing. In Section 5, we discuss nominal rigidities as complementary to the real rigidities
5key feature{ that the number of competitors within each industry, either the
number of domestic competitors or foreign trading partners, aects both the
size of the average markup and the degree or frequency of pass-through.
We introduce a nite, cutthroat group of rivals for each industry within
the BEJK framework that generates the markup and pricing behavior observed
both empirically and numerically in previous studies. We assume an indepen-
dent Fr echet distribution of eciency draws for each country, following Eaton
and Kortum (2002). Our model achieves tractable analytical solutions for the
distribution of markups under autarky and trade with a nite number of rms
competing to supply the market. In short, we build a standard Ricardian
model of trade with a fully specied distribution of markups that is consistent
with observed domestic and export pricing behavior. The assumption in our
model that rivals to the best rm in each industry are latent is not necessary to
achieve these distributions (see de Blas and Russ 2012 for a search framework
with similar numerical results). We maintain this assumption to nest within
existing literature and keep the model as simple as possible while we illustrate
their implications for rm-level and aggregate price adjustment.
Entry in this Ricardian model does not aect the number of goods pro-
duced, but rather the number of rms competing to be the low-cost supplier
of a particular good. \Competing" in this sense means drawing an eciency
parameter from an identical distribution and being ready to jump into pro-
duction if a chance arises to undersell an active rm. The most ecient rm
will have the lowest cost| the rst order statistic for costs in the industry6|
and become the only active supplier. An increase in the number of rms that
compete to be the low-cost supplier of a good changes the shape of the en-
tire distribution of marginal costs and markups. Since the circulation of this
paper, Holmes, Hsu, and Li (2011) have used a similar approach to analyze
agglomeration and allocative eciency, as well as to draw important new in-
sights regarding the gains from trade. Zolas (2011) has shown that the number
arising from market structure.
6The rst order statistic is the rst (lowest) cost in a random sample arranged in ascend-
ing order of magnitude (see David and Nagaraja (2003)).
6of potential competitiors inuences a rm's choice of where to le patents. Fi-
nally Peters (2011) has developed a related framework with dynamic entry to
analyze growth in total factor productivity within a closed economy.
Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2012, hereafter EMX) in an important con-
tribution extend our understanding of and rigorously quantify the degree of
gains from trade due to pro-competitive eects based on the model of Cournot
(quantity-based) competition in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). They use Tai-
wanese data to calibrate the model and estimate the gains, and push the
frontier of Cournot modeling with heterogeneous rms forward by linking the
pro-competitive eects of trade to changes in the dispersion of markups, as
well as the average markup, within a two-country framework, with the second
country representing the rest of the world. They run several experiments, but
the one closest to our treatment of the Bertrand setting of price competition is
their experiment where the distribution of productivity draws across countries
is independent. In this case, they nd that pro-competitive eects of trade are
actually negative in their simulations. The logic behind their result is similar
to the insight drawn by Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodr guez-Clare
(2012a) regarding other models of trade with endogenous markups: highly ef-
cient exporters exploit reductions in trade costs by absorbing them as higher
markups. Our multi-country setting provides a distinct and nontrivial result.
In short, this anti-competitive eect is only likely if trade costs are not lowered
for competing trade partners{ thus, in unilateral, versus multilateral trade lib-
eralization. Second, EMX attribute the result largely to the fatness of the
tails in the distribution of eciency levels, but it is dicult to see the exact
relationship between trade barriers and the parameters of the distribution in
a numerical setting. We show the precise likelihood that lower trade costs
will be absorbed into the markup as a function of this dispersion by deriv-
ing an explicit distribution of markups. In addition, our model suggests that
we can verify empirically whether anti- or pro-competitive eects arise after
liberalization even when it is not possible to measure markups by measuring
whether the degree of pass-through and import price volatility increases (anti)
or decreases (pro).
73 Autarky
The heart of the model lies in the production of intermediate goods by het-
erogeneous rms. For simplicity, we assume that producers of the nal good
are perfectly competitive and assemble the intermediate goods, with no addi-
tional capital or labor necessary. The continuum of intermediate goods j spans
the xed interval [0,1]. The assembly process uses a technology involving a















Output of the nal good is purchased for immediate use by consumers or as an
input into the production of intermediate goods. When used as a production
input, it is fully expended{ no inventories are carried over into future periods.
We consider each intermediate input j as representing a dierent industry and
assume that the price elasticity of substitution between output from dierent
industries  is greater than one. The demand for an individual input is down-



















Each producer of an intermediate good draws an eciency parameter z
from a cumulative distribution F(z) with positive support over the interval
(0,1]. Eaton and Kortum (2009, Chapter 4) describe a process whereby over
time, F(z) can emerge as a frontier distribution representing the eciency
levels associated with the best surviving ideas available to produce a particular
good j. Being the distribution of the best surviving ideas, F(z) naturally takes
on an extreme value form and under mild assumptions, it can be characterized
by a Fr echet distribution.7 Thus, we assume that an endogenous number of
7In particular, EK suppose that each period a group of new ideas emerges with the
quality of these ideas distributed as Pareto. Over time, the distribution of the best (most




We assume that T > 0 and also that the shape parameter, , is positive. Only
the most ecient rm with eciency level Z1(j) in any industry supplies the
market. This eciency parameter increases the level of output a rm produces
from one unit of a composite input Q:
Y (j) = Z1(j)Q(j):






which accounts for both the cost of the composite input, w, and any frictions
involved in sending intermediate goods to the assemblers of the nal good, d 
1 . We assume that both labor and the nal good are used in the production
of intermediate goods with constant cost shares: w = !P 1 , ! being the
labor wage rate and p the cost of a bundle of intermediate goods. The cost
parameter drawn by any rm hoping to produce good j is distributed
G(c) = 1   e
 T(wd) c
:
Given that some number of rivals r draw an eciency parameter hoping to be
ecient) idea surviving from each period then becomes Fr echet, also known as an inverse
Weibull (Pawlas and Szynal, 2000). Costs are inversely related to eciency levels, so costs
in this case are Weibull distributed, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
9the low-cost supplier of industry j, the distribution of the lowest cost C1(j) is8
G1(c1) = 1   e
 rT(wd) c
1: (2)
We assume that d = 1 under autarky in this section and for domestic sales
in the open economy in Section 3. The limiting distribution{ G1(c1) given an
innitely large sample r{ is well dened for any positive, nite T. (See Castillo
(1988, p.116) and Castillo, Hadi, Balakrishnan, and Sarabia (2005, p.207) for
the derivation of the limiting distribution of maxima drawn from a Fr echet
distribution.)
3.1 The distribution of markups
Let C2(j) represent the unit cost of the second-best competitor in industry
j, who sits inactive but ready to begin production instantly should the op-
portunity arise. Given the CES assembly technology for the nal good, the
lowest-cost rm producing good j would like to set a price using what we call
the \unconstrained" markup, where marginal cost equals marginal revenue|
the CES markup  m  
 1 > 1. However, if charging the CES markup results
in a price that exceeds the marginal cost of the second-best competitor waiting
in the wings, the lowest-cost supplier may nd itself undersold. In short, no
rm can charge a price that exceeds the unit cost of its next best rival. The
low-cost supplier in each industry j takes the prices of the low-cost supplier in








8See Rinne (2009), p.237 for derivation. The assumption that BEJK use regarding the
number of entrants to simplify their framework is not stated in the published or working-
paper version of the text. Their results can be replicated by assuming that it is innitely
large. (See Holmes, Hsu, and Li (2011) for details regarding the derivation of the composite
distribution of eciency draws, or our discussion below with regard to markups.) Alterna-
tively, the number would drop out of the analysis if one assumed that the number of rms
competing in any industry is a random variable with a Poisson distribution and integrating
over its domain. In contrast, we preserve the number of rivals in the following analysis.
10With this formula for the markup, we compute the expected output-weighted
price for any good j in several steps. First, note that the price for good j,





C1(j)   m
 mC1(j) for
C2(j)
C1(j)   m
Thus, the pricing rule depends not only upon the distribution of the rst and
second order statistic of the marginal costs, but also upon the distribution of
the ratio of the two order statistics. In Appendix A we use a straighforward
Jacobian transformation on a result from Malik and Trudel (1982) to obtain
the distribution of
C2(j)
C1(j), which is the distribution of the markup before impos-
ing the unconstrained markup from the CES bundling of intermediate goods.
Assuming that the frontier distribution of eciency parameters is identical for
every industry j, the probability density of the ratio
C2(j)
C1(j) is given by
h(m) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
r(r 1)m (+1)
[(r 1)+m ]





2 dm for m =  m
0 for m >  m
; (3)
At the unconstrained markup, there is a mass point, which we show in Figure
1.
Like the distribution of markups given in BEJK, this distribution is sta-
tistically independent of C1(j) and C2(j). In fact, for very large r, we have
limr!1 h(m) = m  1 for 1  m   m, which is a Pareto density for markups
identical to the one in BEJK. With the CES bundling technology, rms will
never set a markup greater than  m, creating a mass point in the density at  m,
since all cases where
C2(j)
C1(j) exceeds  m are assigned a value of  m. The probability












1 + (r   1) m: (4)
11Note that as  m goes from its own upperbound of 1 (for  = 1) to its lower-
bound of 1 (for  ! 1), this probability moves monotonically from 0 to 1, so
it is a well behaved cumulative distribution function over the range of possible
markups.
Proposition 1 The average markup is decreasing in the number of rivals r
under autarky.
Proof. For any given value 1  m0   m, the probability that M(j) 
C2(j)
C1(j) is
greater than or equal to m0 is decreasing in r:














[1 + (r   1)(m0)]2 < 0:
Equivalently, we can say that the distribution of markups when r is low rst-
order stochastically dominates the distribution of markups with a higher r.
First-order stochastic dominance implies a higher expected value; therefore
E[M(j)] must be decreasing in r.
It follows from Proposition 1 that the number of rivals aects the size of the
mass of rms charging the unconstrained markups, as stated in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 In expectation, the fraction of rms charging the unconstrained
markup is decreasing in the number of rivals r under autarky.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1, combined with equation (4) shows that
the probability of
C2(j)
C1(j) being at least as large as  m is decreasing in the number
of rivals. Markups are set equal to  m whenever M(j) would be greater than
 m without the restriction of the CES upperbound. Thus, in expectation,
the fraction of rms charging the unconstrained markup is decreasing in the
number of rivals.
As the number of rivals in an industry j increases, both the average markup
and the probability that any rm charges the unconstrained markup falls|
increased rivalry squeezes markups. Intuitively, the result emerges because,
12on average, increasing the number of rivals in our order-statistic framework
diminishes the dierence between the costs of the two best potential suppliers.
This is not the case for a Pareto distribution of rm eciency levels, as shown
in Appendix A. When rms draw from a Pareto distribution of eciency levels,
markups are again Pareto distributed as in BEJK (and in our special case
above with many competitors), with no impact from the number of rivals. To
reinterpret BEJK's sports analogy in our setup: with the distribution of costs
in equation (2), a competitor running second in a race will run even faster
relative to the winner when there are more competitors behind him. However,
with Pareto eciency draws, no matter how many additional competitors trail
behind in the race, each runner maintains both his speed and spacing relative
to the person in front of him.9 In economic terms, the Fr echet distribution
implies diminishing returns to technological growth through entry: as the
number of rivals increases, there is a greater chance that additional rivals'
eciency draws will fall within the existing production possibilities frontier
than that they will expand it outward.
To illustrate our new distribution of markups, Figure 1 shows the restricted
distribution of markups when r equals its minimum value of 2, versus 20,
the number of rivals chosen by Atkeson and Burstein (2007) calibrated to
match U.S. industry concentration. We use =3.6 and =3.79, as estimated
by BEJK. The fraction of rms charging the unconstrained markup falls dras-
tically, from one-half to just over one-third. We will discuss the implications
of this statistic for price rigidity in Section 5. For now, we use the distribution
of markups to compute the aggregate price level.
9We believe the key dierence is that the value of any outcome z enters the inverse of the
hazard function linearly, which is not the case for the Fr echet used here or the lognormal
used in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Or more simply, the Pareto mean is linear in its
minimum, which is also the case for the uniform distribution. Their density functions are
at or convex, rather than being strictly concave around the mode as in our model.
13Figure 1: Increasing the number of rivals reduces markups
3.2 The distribution of prices
As shown in de Blas and Russ (2011), the joint distribution for the rst and
second order statistic also contains the number of rivals r:













To nd the marginal distribution for C1(j) (C2(j)), one can integrate the
joint distribution over values of c2 (c1).10 We nd that increasing the number
of rivals leads, on average, to lower costs in the industry. We compute the
moment 1   , which appears in the formula for the aggregate price level
Equation (1), for the rst and second order statistics of marginal costs, so
10Integrating the joint distribution over c2 from c1 to 1, for instance, one obtains the
marginal distribution g1(c1) and sees immediately that it is equal to the rst derivative of
G1(c1). To obtain the marginal for C2(j), one instead integrates over c1 from zero to c2, as
we do later for the open economy in Appendix E.































Taking the derivative with respect to r, we see that these 1 th moments are
increasing in r as long as      1. Since we assume that  is greater than
1, the rst moments, E[C1(j)] and E[C2(j)], by implication are falling in r.11
Proposition 2 The aggregate price level P is decreasing in the number of
rivals r under autarky as long as the dispersion in rm eciency levels is
large enough to balance the consumer's love of variety,      1.
Proof. Intuitively, Proposition 2 is true because an increase in r shifts the
distribution of markups to the left at the same time it reduces the expected
marginal cost of the best supplier. More rigorously, since rms in all industries
draw from the same underlying distribution, using the law of large numbers
















Recall that P(j) = M(j)C1(j). Using this pricing rule and noting that the
distribution of the markup is independent of outcomes for the individual order







We show above that both E[M(j)] and E[C1(j)] are decreasing in r as long
as      1, thus P is also falling in r.






is falling in r.
153.3 The number of rivals
The variable in our model which BEJK normalize to suppress the eects of all
other aspects of market structure on markups is the number of rivals r. We
use a free entry condition to motivate the treatment of r as nite.12 Following
Melitz (2003), we assume that there is a uniform probability of death, 0 <  <
1, in every period. Entrepreneurs must pay a xed cost f in order to draw
an eciency parameter. This xed cost is denominated in units of revenue
here, but we can also specify f in units of labor as in Melitz (2003) without
aecting our qualitative results below at all. When drawing, they can only
see how many rivals there are in the industry, not the marginal cost of any
rival. In equilibrium, the nite number of rivals, an integer, must be such that
the expected present discounted value of output for an active producer is no














t+s (Pt+s(j)Yt+s(j)   C1(j)Yt+s(j))jr + 1
#
< f:
We also use the labor market clearing condition to dene market size Y . In
steady state, it is
!L = PY; (7)
where L is the number of workers,  is labor's cost share in the input bundle
used to produce intermediate goods and  is the share of variable costs as a








Isolating Y in equation (7), normalizing the wage w  1, and then sub-
12Since the circulation of this paper, new working papers by Holmes, Hsu, and Li (2011)
and Zolas (2011) have also begun to do so, with dierent applications relating to agglomer-
ation and patenting.














We this present this condition graphically in Figure 2, which is calibrated as
in Figure 1, with the quantity 1 +
f
L calibrated to show entry by 20 rivals
in each industry, the level used in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Recall that
the probability of forced exit, , is independent of rm eciency, and that the
distribution of the markup is independent of the distribution of costs,13 so in









In Appendix B.2, we prove that the left hand side is decreasing in r, as shown
in Figure 2, resulting in a unique equilibrium solution for r. This means that
the number of rivals in each industry grows as the xed cost f, and the exit
rate  fall, as well as when market size L is bigger.
The distribution of the markup derived above does not yield a closed-form
solution for the expected markup E[M(j)] or for the expected log markup,
E[lnM(j)]. However, we can determine an upper- and lowerbound for r. Not-
ing from Jensen's inequality that E[M(j)]  lnE[M(j)] and that lnE[M(j)] 
E[lnM(j)], the form of the free entry condition in equation (10) implies







Proposition 1 states that the mean markup, E[M(j)], is decreasing in the
number of rivals, r. In combination with this insight from Proposition 1,
E[M(j)]  ln(1 +
f
L ) implies that enough rivals simultaneously \enter" the
13To see this, recall that the cost parameters Ck do not enter into the expression for h(m)
for k 2 N.
17industry (i.e., draw a productivity parameter) such that expected prots are
at least as large as the amortized xed cost of entry.
Figure 2: Free entry and the number of rivals under autarky
Appendix B.2 uses expression (9) to derive the upper- and lower- bounds















e  m    m
 r 
E[lnM(j)](e  m   1)
E[lnM(j)]e  m    m
:
Notice that the number of rivals in each industry grows as the xed cost f, the
share of labor in the input bundle , and the exit rate  fall, as well as when
18market size L is bigger. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) show a negative
relationship between markups and market size in U.S. cities consistent with
the scale eect implied by our free entry condition. Note also that entry is not
proportional to changes in market size L, but can grow much faster than L,
a departure from the Melitz model that will impact gains from trade below.
This yields many interesting implications, for example, from equation (2) it is
clear that increasing the number of rivals inuences the distribution of costs
exactly like an increase in the technology parameter T.Thus, reducing barriers
to entry pushes out the technological frontier, in addition to lowering the
average markup. Since  and P are both falling in r, we can see from equation
(7) that reducing either the xed cost or the exit rate increases aggregate
output Y by boosting the number of rivals.
4 Trade in goods
Trade in our model not only shifts production toward lower-cost producers in
the classic Ricardian sense, but also reduces markups in countries with low
contestability, lowering the aggregate price level. The reason is simple: all else
equal, openness increases the number of rms competing to serve the domes-
tic market. In addition, trade costs increase the marginal cost for exporters
situated far from a destination market relative to their rivals, making it more
likely that their price will be bounded by a geographically closer rival. Fur-
thermore, openness has a second eect on the sensitivity of markups to changes
in economic conditions. As trade costs eat into markups due to the direct
competition of rms from closer locations, this relative gravity eect prohibits
a larger fraction of exporters from being able to adjust prices in response to
idiosyncratic or country-specic shocks and limits the degree to which those
that can actually do adjust them.
Below, we focus principally on how trade changes the distribution of markups.
It also has an impact on entry. We do not consider entry in a dynamic setting,
as does Peters (2011), rather, we compare two worlds{ one with trade and one
without{ and characterize the number of rms ex ante that would want to pay
19a xed cost to draw an eciency parameter having been born into one versus
the other.
4.1 The distribution of costs in the open economy
We follow BEJK's notation, adding the subscript n to the terms Ck(j), gk(ck),
and Gk(ck) from the autarkic case to refer to the costs and distribution of costs
for goods supplied to country n in the open economy. When the potential
supplier is from country i we add the subscript i, so that the unit cost of
the kth most ecient rm from country i when supplying any good (j) to
country n becomes Ckni(j), drawn from the underlying cumulative distribution
function Gkni(ck), with the corresponding probability density gkni(ck). We
assume that Eaton and Kortum's (2002) no arbitrage condition for trade costs
holds: dni < duidnu, so that it is always cheaper to send a good directly to its
destination market, never to re-route it through a third country.
Let G1n(c1) be the probability that the low-cost supplier of a good j to the
home country n has a marginal cost less than or equal to some level c1 under
trade. The probability is equal to one minus the probability that any other
potential supplier{ domestic or foreign{ has a marginal cost greater than c1.
The cumulative distribution for low-cost suppliers under trade is thus
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Ti(widni) ri, and dni  1 is an iceberg trade cost involved in shipping
goods from country i to country n for i 6= n. It is straightforward to show
that the probability that a country exports to n is the same as in Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and BEJK, but allowing for the number of rivals:




204.2 Geography and markups
In three steps, we can compute the full distribution of markups under costly
trade with asymmetric countries. First, we consider the case that the best
two rivals for a destination market originate in the same country. Let  ni be
the probability that the two best rivals to supply country n both originate in
country i. Then, it must be that the two best rivals in a particular industry
in country i are more ecient (have lower marginal costs) than any other
potential suppliers of the good to country n. Let c2i be the second-best cost
draw for an industry in country i. Then the probability that it is lower than













where we dene  0
ni =
(ri 1)Ti(widni) 
n Ti(widni)  , the probability that the second best
producer in i will be the second best supplier to country n in the world mar-
ket as a whole, given that the best producer of a good in i is also the best
supplier to n worldwide.14 The distribution of markups in this case is a simple
application of our autarkic distribution, renaming r in equation (3) as ri (see
Appendix C for further detail).
The second step is to compute the probability that the best supplier to n
is from country i and the best rival supplier to supply country n is in country
u 6= i, denoted  niu. The unconditional probability that this occurs is the
probability that the best supplier native to country u has some marginal cost
c1u, which lies between the rst- and second-best draws in country i, c1i and
c2i > c1i, while the best rivals from all third countries (v 6= u;i) have a
marginal cost that is larger than c1u. See Appendix C for the full derivation




























n riTi(widni) , the probability that the second best supplier to
n is in country u conditional on the best supplier being from i while the second




Finally, we compute the distribution of markups charged in country n given
that the best rival to supply a good is in i and the second-best is in country u,
which we call hniu(m). We use the formula for the distribution of the ratio of
two independent random variables, C1ni(j) and C1nu(j), described by Mood,
Graybill and Boes (1974, pp.187-88), given that C1nu(j) is greater than C1ni(j)














[Ti(widni)  + ruTu(wudnu) (m   1)]
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1. The important result for our purposes is the probability that the supplier
charges the unconstrained markup when its next-best rival is an exporter in a
15We show in Appendix C that because the distribution of eciency levels in each country
is independent, terms for third countries cancel out of this conditional distribution. We can
integrate the density over the domain [1;  m], noting the mass point at  m and see that it
forms a well behave cumulative distribution function that integrates to one.
22dierent country,16
Pr[Mniu   m] =
Ti(widni) 
Ti(widni)  + ruTu(wudnu) ( m   1)
: (17)
One can see immediately that the supplier to country n exporting from country
i will be more likely to charge the unconstrained markup when its next-best ri-
val (a) resides in a country far from the destination country n (high dnu), or (b)
resides in a country with low contestability, low technology, or a high wage rel-
ative to country i. The country-i supplier's own distance from the destination
country lowers the probability that it can charge the unconstrained markup.
If all countries are identical, the terms representing technology, wages, and
trade costs cancel out and this expression is easily shown to be lower than the
probability under autarky in equation (4) for nite r  2. We formalize this
result in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If a producer from country i exports to country n with the
next-best rival to supply the same good to country n from a dierent country
u 6= i, then the exporter's market power on average is increasing in country
i's technology relative to country u,
Ti
Tu, but decreasing in country i's relative
wage,
wi
wu; relative distance to the destination market,
dni
dnu; and the level of
contestability in the rival's home country, ru.
Proof. From equation (17), for any markup m0, 1  m0   m, the probability
that the exporter's markup is greater than or equal to m0, given that its rival




Ti(widni)  + ruTu(wudnu) (m0   1)
:
All else equal, the derivative of this probability is increasing in
Ti
Tu. By the
property of stochastic dominance, the average markup is also increasing in
Ti
Tu.
16More generally, the cumulative probability Pr[M(j)  m0] = 1 Pr[Mniu  m0] ranges
from 0 to 1 as m0 increases from 1 to 1, so it is a well behaved cumulative distribution
function for markups.




dnu, and ru. Thus, the average
markup in this case is also decreasing in these three factors.
Considering the special case where the next-best rival resides in the domes-
tic market, u = n, demonstrates that opening to trade from autarky (reducing
dni from innitely large to a much lower level, while dnn remains xed at 1),
we see that trade openness, on average, reduces the market power of domes-
tic producers, forcing them to charge lower markups on sales in their native
market. The only way that the average markup can increase under trade is
if the home country n opened its borders to trade with a world dominated
by one country that was both much closer than other trading partners (low
dni) and this close neighbor was far superior to all other countries by having
much lower labor input costs (low !i), or very advanced technology (high Ti).
What is more, equation (17) implies that reducing the trade cost dni for only
one particular country i increases the probability that a foreign supplier from
i will be able to charge their full autarkic markup when selling to country n.
Thus, our model nests the anti-competitive mechanism underlying results in
EMX and Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodr guez-Clare (2012), but
also demonstrates that it can be superseded by multilateral, as opposed to
unilateral, trade liberalization.
Corollary 2 If an exporter to country n is located in a country i 6= n with
its next best rival to supply n in a third country u 6= i;n, then changing from
bilateral to multilateral trade liberalization reduces the average markup.
Proof. Lowering trade costs only between i and n (dni) reduces i's geographic
friction with respect to n relative to its competitor in country u,
dni
dnu. It follows
from Proposition 3 that exporters from i to n can proceed to charge a higher
markup on average than before the bilateral liberalization given that the next
best rival is in country u. If afterward, country n lowers trade costs with
respect to u, changing from bilateral to multilateral liberalization, then
dni
dnu
increases and by the same Proposition 3, the probability Pr[Mniu  m0] falls.
24Thus, bilateral liberalization can create an anti-competitive eect, increas-
ing market power for exporters on average, while switching from bilateral to
multilateral agreements can generate a pro-competitive eect. As in any Ricar-
dian model, regardless of whether it is bilateral or multilateral, trade openness
reduces prices, as seen in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Trade lowers the aggregate price level.
Proof. A country will never import a good with a higher price than it pays
under autarky and the second-best competitor will never be less ecient than
the second-best competitor under autarky. To quantify the impact on the
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Since  > 1, this moment is strictly greater than its counterpart under autarky.
We also can compute the same 1   th moment for the marginal cost of the
second-best rival by using the probability that it is in the same source country













which we know is at least as great as its counterpart under autarky because
the second-best rival producer of a good j in the entire world (including the
home country) by denition could not have a marginal cost any higher than
the second-best rival under autarky.
25Under costly trade, the markups that rms charge are dierent when they
sell domestically compared to when they export. The formula for the distri-
bution of markups, ~ hn(m), reveals that rms internalize a portion of the trade
cost, unless they are so technologically superior or have such a huge unit input
cost advantage that they can pass the entire trade cost on to the foreign con-
sumer. We demonstrated that the probability of charging the unconstrained
markup is lower when one's next best rival is from a dierent country. The
eect of incremental reductions in the trade cost on the import penetration
ratio is no longer a constant, which Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr guez-Clare
(2012b) report is the case for the BEJK model without entry. More formally,
prots are no longer a constant share of revenues, independent of the variable
trade cost.17 Instead, the share of prots in total revenues varies with the
variable trade cost d, shrinking as d falls and rms are forced to charge lower
markups due to competition from new foreign and possibly new domestic en-
trants. This violates the gravity restriction satised by many trade models,
even though the probability of exporting to any country n, ni, appears very
similar to the export equations in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and BEJK.
Put more simply, the gains from trade liberalization cannot be inferred
from the value of aggregate ows alone because liberalization reduces markups,
distorting the relationship between the trade cost and observed expenditures.
Thus, trade liberalization has the potential to create welfare gains not only
through productivity-based comparative advantage, but also by reducing rms'
market power. We close the model and show output growth under free trade
versus autarky under symmetry and free trade in Appendix E, but save de-
tailed analysis of gains from costly trade with variable markups in this gener-
alized Ricardian setting for future research and in order to focus our analysis
on entry, pricing behavior, and the aggregate price level.
One potential question is whether the fact that rivals within each industry
are latent{ they do not produce and thus can not be observed for empirical
analysis{ is important in interpreting our results. The answer is a resounding
17The constant share in bilateral prot is also an important intermediate result in Arko-
lakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodr guez-Clare (2012a).
26\No." De Blas and Russ (2011) generalize the type of Bertrand competition
employed here to use a search framework in the open economy, which allows
for a continuum of rms to produce the same good as long as search costs
restrict the number of prices that buyers check before making a purchase,
in the spirit of Burdett and Judd (1983) and Alessandria (2009). They use
numerics rather than the analytics here, but all of the same intuition is reected
in the numerical results, suggesting fertile ground for future research applying
our analytical distributions.
5 Price adjustment, volatility, and pass-through
Empirical studies indicate that idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be prevalent
and economically important: Gabaix (2011) nds that a substantial portion
of observed aggregate uctuations in U.S. output can be explained by id-
iosyncratic shocks falling across a distribution of heterogeneous rms, while
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) determine that idiosyncratic shocks
aecting plant-level output have a standard deviation ve times as large as
that of industry-level productivity shocks. Thus, recent literature indicates
that idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be important from a macroeconomic
perspective. In this context, our setup can shed some light on the pricing
behavior of individual rms subject to idiosyncratic shocks in domestic versus
foreign markets. In Appendix F, we analyze price adjustment in the closed
economy with idiosyncratic shocks to x show that the degree of contesta-
bility can aect rms' ability to pass on idiosyncratic (rm-specic) shocks
into prices. We show, drawing from the insights of Kucheryavyy (2012), that
perfect substitutability is not necessary to achieve this type of price rigidity.18
18Kucherayavyy (2012) proves that the market share of each rival to the lowest-cost pro-
ducer in an industry continuously falls to zero as the elasticity approaches innity. By
implication, he contradicts the common misconception that the number of rms charging a
markup constrained by competition with rivals jumps to zero when this elasticity is nite.
In fact, it converges continuously to zero as the elasticity falls to 1. We build on his in-
sights to show numerically a continuous drop in pass-through as the elasticity approaches
1 in Appendix F. Thus, we disagree with the suggestion in Atkeson and Burstein (2008,
p.2013) that the discontinuity in the number of rms, which jumps from r > 0 to 1 when
27Here, we focus on pass-through in the open economy by applying a country-
specic shock.
5.1 Trade and prices
The expressions for markup behavior in Section 3.2 yield pricing-to-market,
incomplete pass-through, and the closely related facts that rms change prices
on exported goods less frequently and with less synchronization relative to
prices in the domestic market. Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and 2008) de-
scribe in brilliant detail the manner in which numerical simulations of BEJK
and an innovative new quantity-based competitive framework result in pricing-
to-market and incomplete pass-through, matching them with data on pricing
behavior. Here, we demonstrate similar results algebraically. First, pricing-to-
market is evident in the formula for ~ hn(m) and both of its components, hi(m)
and hniu(m). Unless trade is costless, rms can charge higher markups in their
home markets than abroad because trade costs increase their domestic market
power, as discussed above. The formulas also depict how rms set markups
depending on the proximity of other export competitors in a particular desti-
nation market, if their next best rival is another exporter. Second, as under
autarky, rms will only fully pass an increase in marginal cost to buyers in
export market n if (a) they are already charging the unconstrained markup,
and (b) the price increase would not surpass the marginal cost of the next-best
rival to supply country n. Although the logic is quite general, we can show
this mathematically if we again invoke symmetry, this time with costly trade.
Suppose again that there is a shock to marginal cost " such that a shock
" > 1 reduces eciency and increases the marginal cost of an industry's low-
cost supplier in country n. Using equation (17), the probability that pass-
the elasticity reaches innity, causes a discontinuity in pricing behavior which would make
Bertrand competition less useful than Cournot or that assuming perfect substitutability is
not a useful approximation to examine limited price exibility.












By Proposition 3, it follows that pass-through is increasing in the technological
advantage of the exporting country,
Ti




wu, and ru{ the
same Ricardian factors that govern the market power of exporters.19
Our markup formulas demonstrate results described in the numerical simu-
lations of Garetto (2012). As we noted above from equation (17), the probabil-
ity that a rm charges the unconstrained markup (and as a result, the degree
of passthrough) in an export market is greater when the exporting country
has a higher level of technology T or a lower wage ! than its competitor's
source country. Thus, we show the point Garetto (2012) argues{ that rms
exhibit less market power in setting markups \when exporting to relatively
more productive (richer) countries."
5.2 Export price rigidity and macroeconomic volatility
The macro-level manifestation of restricted price adjustment in export markets
is reduced volatility in the terms of trade relative to the real exchange rate for
high levels of contestability (r) in the host market or in the presence of trade
costs. To illustrate the relationship between the micro and macro eects of
relative cost shocks across countries, such as a small movement in the nominal
exchange rate (see Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) for a discussion
contrasting the impact of large versus small shocks on the real exchange rate),
Table 1 lists the volatility of the terms of trade relative to the real exchange
rate in U.S. data alongside results from simulated data for small cost shocks
19Although several studies have shown that pass-through depends on the choice of cur-
rency invoicing, Goldberg and Tille (2009) demonstrate that this currency invoicing choice
also depends on the degree of competition in the destination market, so we view our market
structure approach as quite relevant.
29in our model.20 We see in the table that the model delivers a variance in
the terms of trade that is approximately one-half the variance of the real
exchange rate when d = 1:5, between our lower-bound for trade costs of 1.25
from the survey by Russ and Valderrama (2010) and the higher value for
trade costs (1.74) estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). This ratio
of volatilities corresponds with the gure reported for the U.S. in Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2008). The variance of the terms of trade relative to the
real exchange rate increases monotonically as trade costs fall in the symmetric,
two-country case. This relative variance is higher when the level of domestic
rivalry is higher. High trade costs suppress exporters' ability to adjust prices
more strongly than the level of domestic entry, which is quite similar to the
results from the variable elasticity of substitution framework developed by
Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2010).
Thus, we interpret our framework as a complement to but not a replace-
ment for nominal price stickiness analyzed in existing studies.21 However, if we
20That is, to focus on the main mechanism of the Bertrand pricing behavior, these are
small departures from a symmetric steady state without second-order eects on wages or
entry. We use the same calibration as in Figure 1, with lognormal shocks that enter like
" above, but applied to all rms within a country. The shock is lognormally distributed
with log of these shock distributed as normal with mean zero and variance 0.015, so that
the standard deviation is equal to the standard deviation of aggregate technology shocks in
the U.S. estimated by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006), applied to each of two symmetric
countries. Again, these are small deviations from steady state to focus on the workings of
the pricing mechanism, apart from general equilibrium eects. We hold r constant in each
case.
21Qualitative results for pass-through and relative macroeconomic volatilities do not de-
pend on perfect substitutability between goods within a market niche. However, with this
special limiting case of perfect substitutability, distributions in Section 3 imply that the
frequency of price changes will be smaller in export markets than in domestic markets.
Unless an exporting country has a huge advantage in the form of high T, high r, or low
labor costs, it is harder for rms to charge the unconstrained markup in an export market
compared to their native market. This is due to the trade cost, which eectively increases
exporters' marginal cost relative to domestic rms in the destination country. Since rms
must be charging the unconstrained markup in order to pass on idiosyncratic or country-
specic shocks in the form of higher export prices, fewer rms will change prices in export
markets (as compared to their native market) when marginal costs increase. As a conse-
quence, the median and average frequency of price changes must be lower for exports, as
shown by Schoenle (2010) and Fitzgerald and Haller (2010). Interestingly, it also replicates
the frequency of export price changes relative to the frequency of domestic price changes
documented by Schoenle (2010), but only for very low trade costs.
30interpret country-specic shocks as exchange rate shocks, then our results co-
incide with the departure from Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eects observed in
Japan following the Plaza Accord by Obstfeld (2009). He documents that real
exchange rate appreciation coincided with a drop in measured productivity in
the traded goods sector during this period. If the appreciation of a country's
nominal exchange rate results in its exporters charging lower markups, this can
reduce measured TFP, either because reduced markups may cause exporters
to operate under capacity, as Obstfeld (2009) suggests, or due to empirical
methodologies that confound changes in TFP with changes in markups. Us-
ing a numerical framework very similar to the one we present here, Garetto
(2012) similarly nds that an appreciation of an exporter's home currency rel-
ative to that of the destination country squeezes the exporter's markups. In
line with the Ricardian eects in our markup distributions discussed above,
she also nds empirical evidence that pass-through of these shocks is more lim-
ited for exporters selling in countries that are relatively more technologically
advanced{ exactly where we predict their markups would be lower and their
likelihood of pass-through less. Feenstra and Weinstein's (2010) nding that
exporters in low-wage countries, which have lower labor productivity, charge
lower markups also supports this prediction. This is where our approach has
a nontrivial nuance that is hard to reproduce with an assumption of nominal
stickiness, unless we assume that degree of nominal stickiness is increasing in
the technological development of the destination market relative to the source
country.
Table 2 demonstrates that the volatility of the terms of trade in a 2-country
model is higher for any level of trade costs when the home country has a
lower level of available technology, which we interpret as a developing econ-
omy. Similarly, the volatility of both import and export prices is higher in the
developing-country case. We calibrate the exercise from parameter estimates
by Eaton and Kortum (2002), with Tn = 0:5 < Ti = 1. A decrease in trade
costs in the 2-country case dramatically increases the volatility of import prices
and, in more competitive environments (r = 20), it increases the volatility of
import prices faster than export prices. This is compatible with empirical evi-
31dence by Frankel, Parsley, and Wei (2012) demonstrating the higher volatility
of import prices in developing countries and is the ip side of an analysis by
Bergin and Feenstra (2009) that reproduces a drop in the volatility of import
prices for the U.S. when trade increases with developing countries.
Moving one step beyond this Ricardian eect, one can see that reductions
in trade barriers that replace bilateral treaties with multilateral treaties can
actually reduce volatility in traded goods prices for developing countries. Our
multi-country distribution in equation (16) shows the importance of asymme-
try in a multi-country world, demonstrated in the last four columns of Table 2.
In the 3-country world simulated in this table, lowering trade costs across all
trading partners reduces the relative volatility of the terms of trade, as well as
the volatility of import and export prices. The crucial dierence here is that
a bilateral trade liberalization{ maintaining a low level of trade barriers with
only one advanced country{ can result in higher price volatility for a country
with inferior technologies, as high-tech exporters from the advanced trading
partner with favored treatment can take advantage of the relatively protected
environment and inecient domestic competitors by charging higher markups.
Thus, they can pass along more of their own production cost shocks. How-
ever, multilateral liberalization{ lowering trade barriers toward two or more
advanced countries{ can inhibit this markup eect (reduce the market power
of foreign exporters) by forcing competition within the developing country
between high-tech foreign suppliers from dierent advanced countries. This
reduction in volatility for developing countries has some support in new nd-
ings by Flach and Cao (2011) that entry into multilateral trade agreements
like the GATT/WTO or FTAs reduces import and export price volatility in
developing countries.
6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to understand the fundamentals of pricing behav-
ior for heterogeneous rms in the open economy under Bertrand competition.
We provide new distributions of markups which are sensitive to market struc-
32Table 1: Volatility and passthough, two identical countries
U.S. data* d = 1:75 d = 1:5 d = 1:25
r=2 r=20 r=2 r=20 r=2 r=20
TOT
RER 0.56 0.36 0.38 0.56 0.59 1.16 1.21
Avg. pass-through, exports 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
PEX
RER 0.70 0.68 0.87 0.84 1.47 1.40
PIM
RER 0.71 0.68 0.90 0.85 1.55 1.39
*U.S. gures for TOT
RER are from Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008), frequencies from
Schoenle (2010), and pass-through from Gopinath, Itshoki, and Rogobon (2010).
Table 2: Volatility and passthrough, developing country
2 countries, Tn < Ti 3 countries, Tn < Ti = Tj
d = 1:75 d = 1:25 dni = 1:25 < dnj dni = dnj = 1:25
r=2 r=20 r=2 r=20 r=2 r=20 r=2 r=20
TOT
RER 1.04 1.03 3.68 4.27 2.92 3.15 2.56 2.70
Avg. pass-through, imports 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.12
PEX
RER 1.55 1.58 4.12 4.25 3.20 3.23 2.71 2.71
PIM
RER 1.58 1.55 4.92 4.25 3.50 3.23 2.88 2.71
*Tn = 0:5 and Ti = 1 in the 2-country case. Tj = 1 also in the 3-country case, with
dnj = 1:75 in the 3-country case with asymmetric trade costs.
33ture, demonstrating how market structure has important implications for gains
from trade and both the level and volatility of prices. The distributions allow
us to characterize in an analytically clean way rm markup behavior under
trade, as well as the percentage of rms who can change their price in response
to an idiosyncratic shock in any market, or in response to a source-country-
specic shock in an export market. As in previous numerical studies using sim-
ilar frameworks, key results include imperfect pass-through, pricing-to-market,
and a lower volatility of the terms of trade relative to the real exchange rate.
Our breakthrough is that we explicitly characterize in tractable formulas an
endogenous degree of export price rigidity that depends on a multi-country
market structure and varies across destination markets due to the degree of
domestic entry and the level of trade costs.
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38A Deriving the distribution of markups
Malik and Trudel (1982, equation (5.17)) use Mellin transforms to derive the
following distribution for the ratio z =
c1
c2, the ratio of the rst order statistic
to the second, given that the sample is from the Weibull distribution G(c)




[(r   1) + z]2;
Since we specify the (unrestricted) markup as m =
c2
c1, we note that m is a
function of z, m = 1



















[(r   1) + m ]
2 :
Similarly, Malik and Trudel (1982) use a Mellin transform to derive the
following distribution for z =
c1
c2 given a Pareto distribution of eciency draws
(a power law distribution of cost draws)
^ h(z) = z
 1:
Again, we specify the (unrestricted) markup as m =
c2
c1, implying that m = 1
z,






B Free entry under autarky
Since the distribution of markups is the same for all goods j, we drop the goods














Since the natural log is a concave function, Jensen's inequality implies E [lnM1 ] 
lnE [M1 ] and E [lnM ]  lnE [M ]. The function M  has a greater
degree of convexity than M1 , so lnE [M ]   E [lnM ]  lnE [M1 ]  













as taking the log inside the expectation reduces the right-hand side more than













Standard properties of expectations tell us that E [M(j)1 ] > E [M(j) ] for
1 >  > 1 and M(j)  1. In Proposition 1, we showed that E [M(j)] is
decreasing in the number of rivals. Thus, E [M(j)1 ] is increasing in r and
E [M(j) ] is increasing even faster. Thus, E[M(j)1 ]=E[M(j) ] is greater
than 1 and decreasing in r toward 1, meaning that there can only be one r for






B.2 Upper- and lower- bounds for the number of rivals.
The distribution of the markup does not yield a closed-form solution for the
expected markup E[M] or for the expected log markup, E[lnM]. However,
we know from Proposition 1 that the mean markup E[M] is decreasing in r.






, E [lnM ], and














 < jE [lnM ]j. Thus, switching the logs from outside to
inside the expectation in equation (B.1) reduces the left hand side more than the right hand
side.
40Therefore, we determine an upper- and lower- bound for r. Specically, we can
express the minimum number of rivals as a function of the expected log markup
and derive a clean closed-form solution for the maximum number of rivals. Let









(r   1) + (ev)
 
i2:











1 + (r   1)e  m:
Using a generalized version of Chebyshev's inequality23, we can characterize a
lower-bound for the number of rivals:
 mPr[lnM   m]  E[lnM]
r  m
1 + (r   1)e  m  E[lnM]
r 
E[lnM](e  m   1)
E[lnM]e  m    m
:
As noted previously, the expected markup and the number of rivals is inversely
related, a relationship seen here in the lowerbound for r. When E[M] falls,
the lowerbound increases, reecting the fact that more rivals will enter when
the expected markup is high (and vice versa). We know from equation (11)
that the expected log gross markup E[lnM] must be at least as large as the
gross log per-period cost of production, ln(1+
f
L ), producing an upperbound
23See Theorem 5 in Mood, Graybill, and Boes (1974, p.71): For a random variable X, a
nonnegative function g(), and a scalar k > 0, then kP[g(X)  k]  E[g(X)].















e  m    m
 r 
E[lnM](e  m   1)
E[lnM]e  m    m
:
C The distribution of markups under trade
We calculate the distribution of markups using conditional densities and con-
ditional probabilities. That is, one can compute the probability of an outcome
m under costly trade and asymmetry as
~ h(m) = Pr[mjA1]  Pr[A1] + Pr[mjA2]  Pr[A2] + :::Pr[mjAx]  Pr[Ax];
where A1:::Ax are all the possible geographic locations of the rst- and second-
best supplier (both in country 1, one in country one and one in country 2, etc.).
The weights in our expression for the compound distribution in the main text
are the probability of any particular geographic pairing (Pr[A1];:::;Pr[Ax]).
Below, we show how to calculate the weights, then how we calculate the con-
ditional densities for m.
To calculate the unconditional probability that both the rst and second











The rst step is to derive the marginal distribution g2ni(c2i) from the joint
distribution, which is analogous to the joint distribution under autarky but
































































































We can also derive the unconditional probability that the rst and second best
rivals to supply a good to country n are, respectively, from i and u 6= i. We





















































where we dene  0
niu =
ruTu(wudnu) 
n riTi(widni)  as in the main text.
We then dene B as the integral with the rst half of A,




























n Ti(widni)  , also as in the main text. Let C be the integral with
the second half of A, given by




















Finally we combine the two components to compute  niu,
 niu = C   B =  
0











































To compute the distribution of the (restricted) markup conditional on the
best and second-best supplier of a good to country n being from two dierent
countries i and u, respectively, with some arbitrary number V of third countries
we call v, v 2 1;:::;V , we compute the distribution of the ratio
c1nu
c1ni , given that
C1nu < c2ni and C1nu < c1nv for all v. Note that all of the third-country terms
cancel out, since each country's rms draw eciency levels simultaneously






















































































[Ti(widni)  + ruTu(wudnu) (m   1)]
2
The same process results in the distribution of the markups when both of
the two best rival suppliers to n are from the same country i reveals that the
distribution is the same as in autarky, with third-country terms cancelling out
due to the independence of each country's distribution:
hni(m) =
ri(ri   1)m (+1)
[(ri   1) + m ]
The dierence between hniu(m) and hni(m) arises due to the fact that
outcomes c1nu and c1ni come from the best of ru draws from country u's dis-
tribution, which is independent of the realizations of the ri draws in country i
from which the best rm in country i emerges. In contrast, the distribution of
two ordered draws in country i is not independent and thus the dierence be-
tween them can not be constructed from two independent distributions, rather
from one joint distribution.
46D Gains from trade
To close the model under autarky or trade, we use a market clearing condition.
Let D be the share of variable costs in expenditures for each country, given
the vector of trade costs D that it faces when exporting. We can use the free










. Given our unit cost
specication, the share of labor in these variable costs is . Then, the labor
market clearing condition stipulates that payments to labor equal labor's share
in production costs:
!nLn = PnYn:
We use the wage as our numeraire, !  1. Then, we can compare output under


















The rst term on the right-hand side is greater than one and reects the fact
that aggregate revenues and average rm prots fall under trade versus autarky
because opening to foreign competition squeezes markups. We already know
from Propositions 2 and 3a that the autarkic price level is greater than the
price level under free trade. To nd out how much greater, we must substitute






1 + (R   1) mn
 mr
 1

























Even under symmetry, the level of gains from trade clearly depends upon the
number of domestic rivals before liberalization. In Figure 3, we show that
they are lower for countries with a high level of contestability (ra) to begin
24If we do not normalize the wage ! to equal 1, this expression is the ratio of the real
wage under trade, relative to the real wage under autarky.
47with, as these countries already have lower average markups than their trading
partners.
Trade increases contestability for any given market, which reduces markups,
generating a gain from trade that is new to the BEJK framework, though not
to models with alternative environments with imperfect competition, such as
Bergin and Feenstra (2009), Devereux and Lee (2001), Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), and Rodriguez (2011). However, in our model, an increase in entry due
to market scale eects can shift the distribution of eciency levels among ac-
tive rms to the right at the same time it changes the shape of the distribution
of markups, a combination not captured by any of these papers. Thus, the
increase in entry acts both as a technological advance and an increase in the
intensity of competition. Geography, in the form of trade frictions, interferes
with welfare gains from both Ricardian eciency eects and contestability.
E Gains from free trade vs. autarky
To the degree that free trade results in an increased number of rivals for any
particular market, it shifts the entire distribution of marginal costs to the left,
similar to an innovation in available technology T. A particularly clean case
occurs when countries are identical and that trade is costless, so that Ti = T,
!i = !  1, and dni = 1 for all i: Then we see that the distribution for the
lowest unit cost among all potential suppliers to any country n in equation
(12) reduces to the Weibull distribution
G1n(c1) = 1   e
 rNTc
1;
which is observationally equivalent to a world with R = rN rivals who all
draw from an underlying distribution that takes the same form as the distri-
bution of cost parameters for any individual country, G(c) = 1 e Tc.25 The
25The distribution of rst order statistics for samples drawn from a Weibull distrubution
is also Weibull.
48distribution of markups in this special case takes the form
~ h(m) =
R(R   1)m (+1)
[(R   1) + m ]
2 :
The implication is clear: trade has the same eect on the distribution of
markups as increasing contestability and therefore reduces the number of rms
charging the unconstrained markup and, all else equal, the aggregate price
level, which takes the same form as under autarky, but with the total number
of rivals for each market, R. Dening ra as the number of rivals under autarky,
we will show below that R > ra. Proposition 3 follows directly from this
increase in contestability under trade.
Proposition 4 In a world with symmetric countries, free trade (a) increases
the total number of rivals competing to supply a destination market, (b) reduces
the aggregate price level, and (c) reduces the expected markup, as well as the
probability that rms will charge the unconstrained markup.
Proof.
Part a) To show that the total number of rivals under trade equals a number
R > ra, we use the open economy version of the free entry condition and a
labor market clearing condition that takes the same form as the closed economy
version in equation (7) for each country. If all countries are identical and trade
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N ]L < 1 +
f
L , it is clear
that the possibility of exporting strictly increases entry. Thus, leaping from
autarky to free trade increases the number of rivals competing to produce any
good (R = Nr > ra), in addition to reducing prices by reallocating production
to more ecient producers.26
Part b) E[C2(j)1 ] under free trade and symmetry takes the exact form
of its counterpart under autarky, only substituting R > ra for the number of
rivals, making E[C2(j)1 ] greater than its counterpart under autarky. From
the discussion in Lemma 1, we know that E[C1n(j)1 ] must also be greater
than its counterpart under autarky. Therefore, (P)
1  must be greater than
its counterpart under autarky (P a)1 , revealing that the aggregate price level
falls under trade: P < P a.
Part c) It follows directly from the derivative in Proposition 1 and the
fact that R > ra that the average markup falls under trade. Similarly, the
likelihood of charging the unconstrained markup falls when opening to trade.
The results from Proposition 3 echo those of Bergin and Feenstra (2009)
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), but now within the homothetic prefer-
ence structure of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003). Atkeson and
Burstein (2007 and 2008) show the results in Parts (b) and (c) numerically,
while de Blas and Russ (2011) demonstrate that having a large number of
rivals under autarky reduces the impact of trade liberalization on markups.
Note also that increasing the number of trading partners has a similar eect
to increasing the number of rivals in any trading partner, seen in numerical so-
26We assume the xed cost of exporting is zero for simplicity, but one can also derive a
reasonable restriction on the size of a xed cost of exporting that preserves this result.
50lutions calculated by Garetto (2012). Under costless trade, it does not matter
how the rivals are distributed across countries. Markups respond as though all
entrants worldwide compete on equal footing to be the low-cost supplier. As
in classic studies of trade and endogenous market structure, geographic fric-
tions here increase market power, dampening the eect of foreign industrial
structure on domestic markups and prices.
In Figure 3, we show an estimate of the gains for a country opening to
free trade with an arbitrary number of partners identical to itself. In this
stylized case, the number of rivals competing to supply the domestic market
under trade relative to autarky determines the increase in aggregate output.
Each line in the graph represents an increase in the number of rival suppliers
compared to autarky by 1, 5, or 10. The ratio Y t
Y a on the vertical axis is
computed as in Appendix E. The number of total competitors for a market
under trade, R, lies on the horizontal axis. Where R equals 20 under trade,
for instance, we see the gains from trade if there were 10, 15, or 19 domestic
rivals under autarky. For example, a country which under free trade has 20
potential suppliers of a product experiences an increase in aggregate output of
less than 3 percent if it already had 19 competitors under autarky, but greater
than 40 percent, if it had only 10 competitors under autarky. Equation (9)
implies that small countries, ones with smaller market size L, will have fewer
rivals in each industry under autarky. Thus, gains from trade are greatest for
small countries opening to trade, even if a pair of small countries establishes
a free trade agreement, echoing a result in representative rm models such
as Devereux and Lee (2001) under Cournot competition or Novy (2010) with
translog preferences.
F Price adjustment in the closed economy
In the simple, closed-economy framework, a lower number of rivals leads to
more frequent price changes in response to idiosyncratic shocks to marginal
costs. The reason is clear from Figure 1. When r is low, more rms charge
the unconstrained CES markup{ their prices are not tightly bounded by the
51Figure 3: Gains from trade depend on the number of additional rivals
marginal costs of their next-best rival, so they are better able to pass on id-
iosyncratic increases in marginal cost to their customers. The fraction of rms
that set their price equal to the marginal cost of the next-best rival are unable
to do this. Since rms will not change prices in response to an idiosyncratic
shock unless they charge the unconstrained markup, Figure 1 suggests that
at least half of rms will never be able to adjust their prices upward ever,
unless they experience a shock common to all rivals and which aects all rivals
at exactly the same time. We apply a lognormally distributed idiosyncratic
shock with the log of the shock being distributed N(0,10), so that the standard
52deviation of the shock is 10%.27 After 1000 simulations, using the same pa-
rameters as in Figure 1, we compute that, all else equal, 73.3% of rms adjust
their price in response to a shock when r = 2, while the gure falls to 64.8%
when r = 20. This is consistent with results from Nakamura and Steinsson
(2010), who nd that no price changes are observed for 40% of products over
the period 1982-2007, as well as Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Gopinath,
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010), who report static prices for approximately 30%
of their sample. The following corollary to Proposition 1 formalizes this result.
Corollary 3 The probability that shocks to marginal cost are reected in a
rm's price is falling in the number of rivals r, as is price volatility.
Proof. For some random i.i.d. shock " to rm-specic marginal cost with
probability density (") over the domain (0, "), we can compute the fraction of
rms that will raise prices in response to an idiosyncratic increase in marginal
costs. Suppose a shock occurs such that " > 1, increasing the marginal cost
for a particular active rm but not its rivals in the industry.
First, we note that only rms charging the unconstrained CES markup
would be able to increase their prices, since rms setting prices bounded by
the marginal cost of their next-best rival can not. Then, the probability that
a rm will pass an idiosyncratic increase in marginal cost fully to buyers by
raising its price is equal to the probability that the current price ( m times
marginal cost) times the shock does not exceed the marginal cost of the next
best rival,






= Pr[M(j)   m"]:
27This is in line with calibration by Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2011) for micro-level
shocks, drawing on empirical estimates by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) and Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).
53Since the distribution of markups is independent of ", we can compute this
probability as










1 + (r   1)(" m)
(")d": (D.6)
It follows from Corollary 1 that regardless of the probability distribution for ",
as long as the marginal cost shock is independent of the markup, the probabil-
ity of full pass-through under autarky is decreasing in the number of rivals.28
Multiplying " above by some positive constant less than one, we see that the
result is general to any degree of pass-through, not just full pass-through.29
The intuition also applies for a downward cost shock, which is omitted here for
the sake of brevity. In this case, all rms charging the unconstrained markup
would have to lower their prices, otherwise their markup would rise above  m,
implying marginal revenues less than marginal costs. Further, some portion
of rms charging a price equal to C2(j) would also lower prices, namely those
for whom leaving the price at C2(j) resulted in a markup greater than  m.
Thus, downward adjustment is most likely when rms are more likely to have
relatively inecient rivals, which is the case when r is low. Note that having
less complete and less frequent price adjustment in response to idiosyncratic
shocks implies lower price volatility.
Limited pass-through of the marginal cost shock does not depend on the
elasticity of substitution being innite. In Figure F, we vary the elasticity of
28That is, given the calculus used to prove Proposition 1, equation (D.6) implies that the
probability of the markup being high enough to permit adjustment to positive price shocks
is decreasing in the number of rivals r.
29Our assumption that rms pay a xed cost when they become active prevents the
lowest-cost producer from having to adjust prices in response to temporary idiosyncratic
shocks hitting its next-best rivals. The rivals will not nd it protable to try to undercut an
existing producer unless they experience a transitory shock large enough to cover the entire
xed cost. We assume that the variance of costs is small enough that the likelihood of such
a large shock is negligible.
54substitution between varieties within an industry j from 4 (just greater than
our calibrated value for ) to 10,000 and show that pass-through by the low-
cost producer is limited even at this low elasticity and decreases continuously
as the elasticity of substitution increases, in response to a large shock (" = 1)
to marginal cost, given two rivals in each industry. The degree of pass-through
varies the size of the shock and the number of rivals, but always displays this
continuous decreasing behavior. 30
Figure 4: Passthrough declines continuously in the elasticity of substitution
between rival's goods within an industry j
30We are very grateful to Ariel Burstein for alerting us to the fact that this continuity
can be shown numerically and Konstantin Kucheryavyy for sharing insights and code for a
numerical illustration of markup behavior within his proof in Kucheryavyy (2012).
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